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Abstract 
Applying the institutional theory to examine the universal services policy in Vietnam, the paper looked 
at the institutional factors influencing the formulation and deployment of “the Program on provision of 
universal service till 2010”. The formulation of universal services policy in Vietnam was remarkably 
affected by directives of the Communist Party of Vietnam as well as the international commitments that 
Vietnam participated in. It is of a different feature compared to other countries. Furthermore, the 
implementation of this Program revealed the loose co-operations between central government (Ministry 
of Information and Communications - MIC) and the department of provincial governments 
(Departments of Information and Communications - DICs) as well as DICs and telecom providers in 
supervising the implementation of this Program. Consequently, telecom providers overlapped in 
provision of universal services, and households could get the same subsidies from two or three operators. 
The outcome of this paper recommends that the central government should emphasize the role of DICs 
and encourage them to be more involved in the formulation and implementation of universal services 
policy.  
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1 Introduction 
The concept of universal service in telecommunication sector has emerged since the liberalization of the 
field (Calvo, 2012). It has constantly changed and been expanded (Alleman et al., 2010; Msimang, 
2012). Previously, universal service was regarded as the provision of basic voice telephone (Garnham, 
2001; Levin, 2010; Msimang, 2012) with an affordable price. However due to the rapid development of 
technology, the integration between voice and data service, and the emergence of high-speed broadband 
networks the concept of universal service is nowadays being extended to include dial-up and broadband 
internet in its scope (Levin, 2010; Msimang, 2012). Furthermore, in some parts of the world broadband 
connection nowadays covered 100% of households (Europe in 2013) and their next target has fastened 
the speed of broadband up to 50Mbps (European Commission, 2013).  
Apparently, the scope of universal service is increasingly evolving. The policy plays a critical role in 
stimulating the development of ICTs in general and telecoms services in particular (Falch, 2007). The 
universal service policy is also a useful instrument to close the digital divide between users (low and 
high-income users) and areas (low and high-cost areas) in a nation (Blackman & Srivastava, 2011). 
According to the ITU, universal service has three fundamental characteristics: availability, accessibility, 
and affordability. The main target of universal service is to ensure individual accessibility to basic 
telecommunications services regardless of geography, gender, ethnicity, disabilities or other factors. 
Similarly, Laffont & Tirole (2000) posit that the objectives of universal service are redistribution 
towards low-income residents and provision of more potential benefits to rural areas (regional planning). 
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They point out that universal service “ensures the quality of telecommunication services at affordable 
rates to consumers, including low-income consumers, in all regions of the nation, including rural, 
insular, and high-cost areas.”  
In order to close the gap, there are various factors essential to explore. In other words, there is a wide 
range of ways that governments are able to pursue, such as market liberalization, promotion of 
competition, raising awareness of ICT benefits, improving the skill of ICT usage, and making it 
affordable and more attractive to users (Kelly & Rossotto, 2012). More specifically, a number of authors 
have studied the role of the government (Falch, 2007; Fan, 2005; Gillett et al., 2004; Kalra & Borgohain, 
2004; Lee & Chan-Olmsted, 2004; Picot & Wernick, 2007; Thai et al., 2015), some have presented new 
models (Falch & Anyimadu, 2003; Falch & Henten, 2010; Peha, 1999), and others have identified 
factors influencing the adoption of internet/broadband (Chaudhuri et al., 2005; Choudrie & Dwivedi, 
2006; Choudrie & Lee, 2004; Flamm & Chaudhuri, 2007; LaRose et al., 2007; Long, 2010). All of these 
research implicitly or explicitly point out the way bringing more advance of ICTs into unserved areas 
or for low-income users. 
Following this mainstream, this research was adopted to analyze the universal service policy from an 
institutional perspective, with the empirical case from Vietnam. Specifically, the research attempted to 
examine institutional factors relating to universal service in Vietnam from 2000 - 2010, how these 
factors related to each other, and which type of institutional factors Vietnam should focus on building 
and implementing the policy. 
To answer these questions, the paper applies the Koppenjan & Groenewegen (2005)‘s four-layer model 
“levels of institutional analysis” to look at the universal service policy in Vietnam. This model was 
designed by analyzing the role of institutions in the context of complex technological systems. 
Moreover, the documentary analysis also is recruited to evaluate secondary documents gathered from 
Ministry of Communications and Information, Vietnam Public Utility Telecommunication Service Fund 
(VTF), and some data from ITU and the World Bank. The paper also conducted some interviews with 
officials working in MIC, DICs, and VTF in July 2015. In which, MIC is a central government body in 
charge of governing telecommunications and post field as well as issuing regulations and legal 
documents throughout the country; DIC is a department of provincial governments in charge of 
governing telecommunications and post field in their province; VTF who is an organization belonging 
to MIC is responsible to collect financial contributions from telecom providers as well as provide 
telecom providers subsidy to deliver universal services. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical framework and research method, 
section 3 analyzes institutional layers in Vietnam, and section 4 is discussion and conclusions. 
 
2 Theoretical framework and research method 
2.1 Theoretical framework 
The concept of institutions is very diverse and depends on the ways approached (King et al., 1994; Scott, 
1987). Overall, Scott (2005:408) argues that institutional theory looks at the processes and mechanisms 
that form structures, rules, and routines in order to explain social behavior. By a historical approach, he 
looks at institution theory as a process of instilling value, a process of creating reality, a class of 
elements, and as a distinct societal sector (Scott, 1987). From an analysis approach, he categorizes 
institution theory into three perspectives: rational choice, normative, and cultural-cognitive perspective 
(Scott, 2005). Rational choice perspective accounts for social behavior via examining rule systems 
created by individuals to promote and protect their own interests. Normative perspective refers to values 
and norms that introduce preferences, desires, evaluations, and rules into social life. Finally, cultural-
cognitive perspective as “the shared conceptions that define the nature of social reality. This reality is 
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developed in social interaction among individuals as they create and share interpretations of what is 
going on, on both micro and macro levels” (Scott, 2005:411). Basically, through understanding 
institutions, we may know and explain social behavior.  
Specifically, approached from an economic view or a rational choice perspective (as clarified above by 
Scott, 2005), North (1990:3) defines institutions as “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, 
are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”. Institutions are formed to guide 
human beings into interaction and to reduce uncertainty in their daily life (North, 1990:6). North 
(1990:35) also asserts that a model of institutions is made up of three elements: informal constrains, 
formal constrains, and enforcement. Informal constrains are codes of conducts, norms of behavior, and 
conventions and are a part of culture. Formal constrains are formal rules, from constitutions, to statute 
and laws, to bylaws, and to individual contracts. Formal rules are created and evolved along with 
increasingly complex societies, and can complement and increase the effectiveness of informal 
constrains (North, 1990). Ultimately, enforcement as a body that enforces parties effectively to obey 
contracts or agreements. More importantly, North (1990:53) concludes that a mixture of three factors 
will define the choose sets and result in outcomes.  
More practically, King et al., (1994) look at the diffusion of information technology innovation under 
the role of institutions. According to King et al., (1994) an institution is any existing social body that 
influences and regulates over other social entities. They point out that incorporating institutions will 
create a link between social concepts such as ‘society’ and ‘culture’, and entities such as organizations, 
firms, groups, and individuals. In the research, they posit that releasing critical institutions factors is to 
facilitate the diffusion of information technology innovation.  
Similarly, Koppenjan & Groenewegen (2005) examine complex technological systems considered as 
multi-actor systems including not only technology aspects but also behavior of actors. They define 
institutions as “a set of rules that regulate the interaction between parties involved in the functioning of 
a (technological) system”. To design/redesign complex technological systems they argue that aside 
looking at technological challenges it is also necessary to analyze an institutional structure that 
coordinates the positions, relations, and behavior of the parties in this system. It will make these systems 
more stable and reduce the transaction costs between parties. This coordination can be shaped informal 
laws or of an informal nature.  
To function technology systems or institutional design, Koppenjan & Groenewegen (2005) introduce a 
four-layer model which offers the building blocks for identifying the steps to be considered in processes 
of institutional design. The first layer is the level of individual actors (like firms and households) and 
their interactions in the context of a complex technological system in order for creating and influencing 
provisions, services, and outcomes. The second layer is formal and informal institutional arrangements 
of socio-technological systems. At this level, agents in networks create regimes or mechanisms to 
coordinate the transactions relating labor, capital, intermediate goods, information, and so on. Formal 
arrangements are contracts, joint ventures, strategic alliances, etc. Informal arrangements are codes of 
conduct, norms, and relations. The third layer of the model is legal rules that are the formal rules of the 
game. The layer determines the legal positions of the players of the game and the mechanism available 
to coordinate transactions. The last layer includes elements such as culture, values, norms, attitudes. 
They are the informal institutional environment and they influence significantly on the mindset of actors 
in networks at layer 1. The layer determines what kind of incentive structures are acceptable and what 
would be effective.  
In the model, these layers interact and influence mutually. The higher layer constrains and shapes the 
lower ones and the lower layers influence the development of the higher ones.  
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Figure 1: The four-layer model (Koppenjan & Groenewegen, 2005) 
 
Based on the above definitions, institutions may be understood as rules influencing human interaction 
and reduce uncertainty in society. 
 
2.2 Research method 
The paper applies the four-layer model of Koppenjan & Groenewegen (2005) to identify institutional 
factors influencing the formulation and deployment of the “Program on the provision of public 
telecommunications services till 2010” in Vietnam. Then, the paper examines the interplays between 
these factors to look at the policy functions. 
The paper also recruits the qualitative method to analyze secondary documents such as documents of 
the Vietnamese government (the data was mainly collected from Vietnamese Ministry of Information 
and Communication and the Vietnam Public Utility Telecommunication Service Fund) and some data 
from ITU and the World Bank. The documentary analysis is appropriate to examine public and private 
documents, and “enables a researcher to obtain the language and words of participants at a convenient 
time” (Creswell, 2009). Moreover, to complement and robust the documentary analysis, the paper also 
conducted interviews with some officials working in MIC, DIC, and VTF in July 2015.  
In order to apply this model, this research considers the universal service policy as a complex 
technological system, and institutional factors influencing a complex technological system also impact 
on the universal service policy. 
Layer 4: Informal institutional environment of socio-
technological systems: norms, values, orientations, codes 
(informal institutions, culture) 
Layer 3: Formal institutional environment of socio-
technological systems: Formal rules, laws and 
regulations, constitutions (formal institutions) 
Layer 2: Formal and informal institutional arrangement 
of socio-technological systems: Gentlemen agreements, 
covenants, contracts, alliances, joint-ventures, merges, 
etc. Informal: rules, codes, norms, orientations, relations 
Layer 1: Actors in socio-technological systems: 
Actors/agents and their interactions aimed at creating and 
influencing (infrastructural) provisions, services, and 
outcomes 
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Since 2005, Vietnam has initially emphasized the provision of universal services by implementing two 
programs. One program “the Program on the provision of public telecommunications services till 2010” 
(hereinafter called the Program 74) was implemented from 2005 - 2010. The total budget of this program 
was approximately 210 million euros. The second is “the Program on the provision of public 
telecommunications services until 2020” with a total budget of 440 million euros. This second program 
is being implemented. The paper looks at the process of formulation and implementation of the Program 
74. 
According to the Program 74, the term “universal service” in Vietnam was regarded as public 
telecommunications services that included universal telecommunications services and mandatory 
telecommunications services. The universal telecommunications services were standard telephone 
services and standard Internet access services; the mandatory services were emergency calls. This 
concept will be used in the research. 
 
3 Analysis of institutional layers in Vietnam 
3.1 Layer 1 
In this layer, actors implemented the Program 74 were diverse ranging from the national level to end 
users (Thai et al., 2015), including MIC, VTF, DICs, telecom providers (VNPT, Viettel, ETC, and 
Vishipel), and end users (citizens or households).  
The interactions among these actors enhanced the provision of universal service in under or unserved 
areas. In their study, Thai et al., (2015) argue that all of these actors played a role in deploying the 
Program 74, especially the role of MIC as a central actor creating the rule of the game. In an interview, 
an official of MIC who participated in managing and supervising the Program 74 said that “Apparently, 
MIC played an important role in building up and instructing others actors to implement the Program. 
Besides, the role of telecom providers was also critical”. According to him, DIC as a provincial body 
governing ICT activities could have played an important role in deploying the Program 74. Because of 
their position, they would have drawn provincial ICT development strategies and guided local operators 
to implement them. However, in the first stage of the Program 74, their role was ignored and not 
embraced. Local providers based on their business strategies as well as the instructions from MIC, VTF, 
and their mother company to implement the Program 74. Some areas were very isolated and 
mountainous local providers did not provide universal services, DICs could not cooperate or guide them 
to do the provision.  
Figure 2 below demonstrates the interactions between these actors in implementing the Program 74. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The interactions among actors (Circular 05/2006/TT-BBCVT)1 
 
                                                          
1 Circular 05/2006/TT-BBCVT: Guidelines for deploying the program on provision of public 
telecommunications service till 2010 
DIC 
MIC 
VTF 
Telecom 
Providers End users 
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3.2 Layer 2 
According to Koppenjan & Groenewegen (2005), at this level, actors make institutional arrangements 
or mechanisms to coordinate the transactions between them. In the case of Vietnam, the mechanism was 
interactions among these actors in order to deliver universal services. Indeed, this mechanism was 
administrative orders, not created by a market regime. MIC designed the Program 74 and then submitted 
to the Prime Minister for approval. After being approved, MIC clarified the Program 74 by issuing a 
series of decisions or legal documents to instruct and request VTF, DICs, and telecom providers to 
implement the Program 74. 
According to regulations of the Circular 05/2006/TT-BBCVT (as demonstrated in figure 2), MIC 
requested telecom providers keen on providing universal services to build up their plans and then hand 
in MIC for approval. Telecom providers’ plans basically outlined and depicted their capability and 
budget needed to deliver universal services. These plans also consisted of estimated numbers of fixed 
lines, of internet connections, and of public internet access centres that would be developed.  
On the other side, MIC requested VTF to construct a plan and submit to MIC for approval. This plan 
referred to how much of subsidy would be allocated to telecom providers and how much of incumbent 
providers’ annual revenue would be contributed to VTF2. Based on the approved plan, VTF delivered 
telecom providers funding. Beside this administrative orders3, the interactions between VTF and 
telecom providers were also formed through credit contracts. Telecom providers would be provided soft 
loans within a certain period of time in order to develop infrastructure to deliver universal services.   
Another actor participating in making the institutional interaction was DICs. DICs involved in the 
Program 74 by managing and supervising telecom providers’ activities in their province4. DICs were 
assigned by MIC to verify these telecom providers’ plans in order to ensure them appropriate with others 
ICT plans at their local5. Actually, the role of DICs in making these institutional arrangements was 
relatively small. As an official of MIC said “the participation of DICs in confirming the exact number 
of provision of universal service of telecom providers was late (due to no detail instructions of MIC). 
Hence, this impacts on delivering subsidy to telecom providers”. And a vice director of one DIC in an 
interview with the first author in July 2015 also said “Many our ideas or opinions in terms of improving 
the provision of universal services did not be paid attention from MIC. Consequently, some of universal 
services were not appropriate with their local citizens’ needs”. 
Figure 2 apparently shows that there is no interaction between MIC, or VTF, or DICs and end users, 
only the interaction between telecom providers and end users. Meanwhile, end users were the main 
object and beneficiaries targeted6. It is likely that the preferences and skill of end users (ability to use 
computer, advance of the internet) were not paid attention by the government (MIC). The government 
only provided basic services that they wanted, not from end users’ preferences. As a result, many end 
users gave up using these universal services when the government stopped the subsidy7. According to 
the vice director of a DIC, “the main reason that did not encourage people using the internet was low 
                                                          
2 Telecom providers had to provide VTF financial contribution that relied on the annual revenue (Decision 
191/200/QD-TTg, and 186/2007/QD-TTg)  
3 MIC also required telecom providers to hand in VTF their plans submitted to MIC (Circular 05/2006/TT-
BBCVT)  
4 Circular 05/2006/TT-BBCVT 
5 Ibid 
6 Decision 74/2006/QD-TTg 
7 The government funded dwellers end devices (telephone sets, or modems to connect to the internet), and part of 
installation fee and monthly subscription fee of universal services via subsidizing telecom providers. However, 
due to no having real need they stopped using the universal services when the government ended the subsidy 
(Report on the results of the program 74:pg 27, MIC-2012) 
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demand. End users, particularly who lived in isolated and mountainous areas did not perceive the 
advance of the internet. Public internet access centres were mainly used for playing games”.   
On the other side, due to the lack of cooperation between DICs, telecom providers, and VTF in 
supervising the provision of universal services that led to overlapping in delivering universal services. 
Consequently, households could receive subsidies of a service from two or three providers, and the 
government had to spend two or three times the subsidy for households (Lam, 2013). 
Although telecom providers received funding from the government to provide users universal services, 
they did not clearly declare their promotion programs which came from the government’s subsidies or 
from their own budget8. They deliberated to make customers understanding that all of the low charges 
that customers could get was from telecom providers.  
 
3.3 Layer 3 
Layer 3 is a formal institutional environment of socio-technological systems. It includes legal rules, 
laws and regulations, and constitutions that introduce the formal rules of the game (Koppenjan & 
Groenewegen, 2005). Formal rules relating to universal services was not in existence in Vietnam before 
1995 (Lam, 2013). Telecommunication services at that time were not prevalent and only used by state-
own enterprises and other organizations (Lam, 2013). 
In general,  Vietnam has begun the reformation and liberalization of telecommunications market since 
1995 (Thai, et al., 2015) by splitting up the regulatory and business function from the Department 
General of Post and Telecommunications - DGPT (a governmental body, predecessor of MIC today), 
establishing a state-owned company - VNPT, and granting licenses to more new entrants (Viettel and 
SPT). 
Along with the telecommunication liberalization, in 1995 universal services were initially focused and 
ruled. However, the definition was very simple, the type of universal services was not clear, and no 
objective was addressed9. The regulatory framework for universal services was gradually built up since 
the bilateral trade agreement between Vietnam and the United States was signed in 2000 (Lam, 2013 : 
154). As such, American telecom providers were entitled to invest in the Vietnam telecom market. In 
other words, the telecommunication market was now opened to foreigners and other competitors, all 
telecom providers were on a level playing field, and the government could not allow VNPT (the first 
state-owned telecom-post company in Vietnam) to apply the cross subsidy regime to deliver universal 
services. Furthermore, in compliance with international commitments on competition from the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) on basic 
telecommunications (Ha et al., 2005), the government also had to give up the price support regime for 
state enterprises and look for other tools to deliver universal services.  
In 2002, the Standing Committee of National Assembly past the Ordinance on Post and 
Telecommunications (43/2002/PL-UBTVQH10) in which it regulated universal services. Although 
universal services were defined more specifically, up to 2006 the government had plans to provide 
universal services (the Program on provision of universal service till 2010 - the Program 74). Based on 
that MIC introduced a bundle of legal documents and decisions to guide its subsidiaries (VTF and DICs) 
and telecom providers to implement the Program 74 (around 40 different documents within 5 years 
2006-201010).  
                                                          
8 Ibid 
9 Article 13 section 2 of the Degree 51/CP only regulated that: VNPT enables provision of basic 
telecommunication services in whole country (including the isolated and mountainous areas).  
10 At http://mic.gov.vn/vtci/Pages/ThongTin/114206/Cac-van-ban-lien-quan.html. Accessed at April 28, 2016 
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In this formal institutional environment, beside the Program 74, Decision 191/2004/QD-TTg (Decision 
191) and the Circular 05/2006/TT-BBCVT (Circular 05) could be seen as the most important regulations 
stipulating entirely interactions between actors (in layer 2) as well as activities that these actors had to 
perform. The Decision 191 permitted MIC to establish VTF in order to manage and supervise subsidies 
as well as collect financial contributions (mainly from telecom providers). The Circular 05, as depicted 
in the previous sub-section, regulated all activities that VTF, DICs, and telecom providers needed to do 
for providing universal services. 
3.4 Layer 4 
Layer 4 is an informal institutional environment of social-technological systems including the informal 
rules (culture, values, norms, and attitudes) of the game and they have influences on the mindset of 
actors in level 1 (Koppenjan & Groenewegen, 2005). 
According to Lam (2013: 144), the Vietnamese law in general and universal services policy, in 
particular, is influenced by a complex mixture of neo-Confucian concepts of “virtue”, French colonial 
legality, and revolutionary and war morality. Additionally, law and legal regulations are closely tied to 
policies of Communist Party of Vietnam-CPV (Lam, 2013). The policies of CPV affect all aspects of 
society from the highest legislative body (the Vietnamese National Assembly) and the highest 
administrative body (the central government) to the lowest administrative level (communes). Chief 
officials at all levels are selected and appointed by CPV (Lam, 2013). Policies in the telecom sector are 
also influenced by policies of CPV. In 2000, CPV introduced Directive 58-CT/TW (2000), namely 
“Enhancing the application and deployment of ICT to support the national industrialization and 
modernization”, in which CPV addressed targets that basic telecommunications (and postal) services 
would be achieved by the end of 2010 (Lam, 2013).  Based on the Directive, the government built up 
telecommunication and post developments strategies as well as other social - economic development 
strategies.  
On the other side, the administration system in Vietnam affected by French colonial legality is divided 
into three levels: province, district, and commune11. At the province and district level, they have 
departments or divisions that manage and supervise all activities relating to society, economy, security, 
culture, etc. in their location12. As such, DIC as a department of provincial government is responsible 
for all ICT activities in their province.    
Apparently, this informal institutional environment is not direct legal rules13, however, they influenced 
directly level 3 (formal institutional environment) and almost all actors in level 1 (MIC, DICs, state own 
operators, and VTF).  
 
4 Discussion and conclusions 
In Vietnam, building up telecommunication policies in general and universal services policies, in 
particular, was considerably influenced by directives of CPV. Although, CPV is not a legislative body, 
neither an executive entity, and nor a judicial branch, they control over all government systems and 
society (Lam, 2013). They also appoint officials and administrators at various levels, particularly to the 
highest positions in the key state organs (Lam, 2013). And these officials and administrators will specify 
these CPV’s directives by issuing legal documents to carry out. The Program 74, one of the outcomes 
of clarification of CPV’s directives, was specified by the Prime Minister from the Directive 58-CT/TW 
                                                          
11 Law on Organization of Local Administration (77/2015/QH13). 
12 Ibid 
13 Policies of CPV are not laws as well as legal regulations. However, all members of the government are also 
members of CPV. Furthermore, CPV introduces the Prime Minister to the National Assembly for voting. Hence, 
CPV’s strategies and directions are considered as binding directives for the government (Lam, 2013).   
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(2000)14 of CPV. In other words, it is likely that Vietnam is pursuing the developmental approach in 
telecom sector that includes facilitating the social-economic growth, inventing directly in the market, 
and financing and tax incentives (Falch et al., 2016). 
Besides, the formulation of the Program 74 also resulted from the international commitments of 
Vietnam, especially the Bilateral Trade Agreement between Vietnam and the United States. Opening 
the telecommunication market means that other operators will enter and compete in this 
telecommunication market, all providers will be on a level playing field. Consequently, the government 
had to eliminate the cross subsidy regime applied for VNPT and looked for other tools to deliver 
universal services.  
In the process of implementing the Program 74, the interactions between DICs and telecom providers 
as well as between MIC and DICs were not streamlined. The interaction between MIC and end users 
was not in existence. In other words, due to the lack of MIC’s guidelines DICs could not play their role 
in supervising the provision of universal services of operators. These operators delivered universal 
services as the plans approved by MIC and their own business plans. As a result, many households could 
receive subsidies of the same service from two or three providers. Furthermore, some of universal 
services were not appropriate with inhabitants’ needs. MIC only offered universal services that they had, 
not services inhabitants needed. Finally, many households gave up using these services when the 
Program 74 stopped funding.  
Hence, the government should emphasize the role of DICs in supervising the provision of universal 
services of providers as well as encourage them to be more involved in the formulation and the 
implementation universal services policy. As a vice director of a DIC said “MIC cannot understand 
dwellers’ preferences and characteristics as DICs do. The provision of universal services will be really 
effective if MIC decentralize their budget and rights in deploying the program”. MIC may not directly 
and constantly interact with end users, DICs will represent them to contact their local citizens to 
recognize what is the real demand for universal services.  
Based on the institutional theory, the paper pointed out that institutional elements influencing the 
universal services policy (the Program 74) in Vietnam such as informal institutional environment (the 
directives of CPV) and formal institutional environment (international commitments). This research also 
showed that the interactions between these actors in deploying the Program 74 were transacted via 
administrative orders, not by a market regime. All activities relating to provision of universal services 
were performed as the instructions of MIC. Telecoms providers had to set up plans and submit MIC for 
approval. Although the Prime Minister regulated the auction to select carriers delivering universal 
services, it is likely that MIC preferred the form of ‘order place’ or ‘plan assignment’ imposed on 
operators.   
This research has some limitations. Examining the Program 74 within a certain period of time to evaluate 
the policy of universal services in Vietnam may not reflect all aspects of this universal services policy. 
Besides, this research has not yet analyzed the influence of layer 4 (culture, values, norms, and attitudes) 
on end users’ preferences and behavior (layer 1) for universal services. Future research should look at 
more another program (the Program on the provision of public telecommunications services until 2020) 
in order to get more insight into this policy.  
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